In an Ideas piece in Slate, former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer tackles concludes that while we already know many of the causes of the financial collapse, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission should answer four unanswered questions. The first:

The first structural issue that Phil Angelides and his colleagues should investigate is what corporate boards knew about the state of corporations they governed and why they did so little to protect them. The commission should inquire about what information board members received about risk and leverage and how accurate that information was. We need to understand exactly what the boards of Citi, Lehman, Merrill, Goldman, and Bank of America were told. Tracing the information flow will also permit us to understand whether the risk analysis was wrong from its inception, ignored by those up the chain, or filtered as it went up the chain.

In other words: what did the fat cats know and when did the fat cats know it? Corporate boards have a responsibility to their shareholders across America and the world. When corporate boards shirk their responsibilities, it's not just their shareholders who hurt. Bad corporate governance impacts the entire economy and causes pain for millions of people. It's time for answers and sunlight from these corporate boards. Spitzer's second question:

Second, the Angelides commission should dig into the corporate-compensation process. What, exactly, did compensation consultants and compensation committees say and do—and why? My one investigative experience in this area revealed a veritable swamp of conflicts and aberrant information flow. (Anybody with time to spare and a desire to read a horrifying tale of corporate failure should read Dan Webb's report about Dick Grasso's pay package.) The commission should dissect the actual e-mail traffic, determine what metrics were used by the comp consultants, and examine what information went to the comp committees of each of the companies that received any federal assistance. I would give long odds that they discover a welter of conflicts of interests—e.g., compensation consultants whose livelihoods depend on the good wishes of the CEO whose compensation package they are determining.

The American taxpayer forked over hundreds of billions of dollars to these fatcats. And, they continued to take lavish bonuses. We deserve to know the nature of how these bonuses and other compensation structures. After all, our money flowed into these structures, and, if they are corrupt, we deserve to know about it. Spitzer's third question:

Third, the rating agencies must bare their souls to the world. We know that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the way ratings agencies are compensated, but we do not yet know whether their straight analytical skills were right, wrong, or somewhere in between. Examining their actual financial models might reveal that they were as sophisticated as possible—or that they were unforgivably sloppy.

The rating agencies are the equivalent of the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. They are designed to provide independent analysis of risk. While Spitzer isn't alleging corruption, he wonders if their models are solid, or, just plain sloppy. If we're putting credence in these ratings, we need to know that they are based on sound modeling. Spitzer's final question:

Fourth, the commission must put the New York branch of the Fed under its microscope. The New York Fed was at the center of every major transaction during the meltdown, and it was the essential supervisor of the organizations and the credit markets beforehand. How did the New York Fed evaluate the risk, leverage, and stability of all the debt that accrued over the prior years. And what did New York Fed officials tell bank officials prior to and during the meltdown? The Fed has managed to avoid scrutiny for years. That should be permitted no longer. This record is too essential. Former New York Fed boss Geithner and Fed Chairman Bernanke misunderstood the impact that the sub-prime defaults would have on the broader credit markets: Was that a consequence of bad analytical work within the Fed? This question has enormous implications for how we respond, and it affects which institution should be vested with the so-called "systemic risk" regulator power.

We put a lot of faith in our regulatory bodies. Did they fail us? And, how, exactly, did they fail us in the lead up to the collapse? These are just a few unanswered questions and we deserve answers from Phil Angelides and his Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.