The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was supposed to get to the bottom of what caused the financial crisis. Instead, they're busy fighting among themselves:

In recent months, a top investigator resigned, frustrated by delays in assembling a staff. Behind closed doors the panel’s chairman and vice chairman have had heated disagreements over whether to make public preliminary findings or revelatory documents. Entities like Citigroup and the Treasury have complained that the panel’s requests for information have been vague and voluminous.

The people appointed to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission last July, six by Democrats and four by Republicans, say they hope to publish, by the Dec. 15 deadline, a volume much like the 9/11 Commission report, which was acclaimed for its narrative sweep and became a surprise best seller.

But that goal seems increasingly out of reach, given what the commissioners themselves acknowledge has been a haphazard approach and a lack of time and resources. Given the delays, the commission’s impact on policy could be modest; the House has already voted on a sweeping financial reform bill, and the Senate could vote on it by summer.

The FCIC meets this week. They will question Alan Greenspan and CitiGroup executives. It's time for the FCIC to put aside their petty disagreements and focus on the matter at hand: examining the roots of the financial crisis. Once they do, they'll realize that years of right wing driven deregulation gave Wall Street a blank check to develop a system that put their profits first and our economic health second.

Mark your calendars for April 7-9th. The next meeting of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) is going to make waves. Alan Greenspan, Citigroup execs, Fannie Mae execs and others will testify. Here's the full schedule:

DAY ONE –WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7

Session 1: The Federal Reserve
Mr. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Session 2: Subprime Origination and Securitization
Mr. Richard Bitner, Managing Director of Housingwire.com,
Author, “Confessions of a Subprime Lender: An Insider’s Tale of Greed, Fraud & Ignorance”
Mr. Richard Bowen, former Senior Vice President and Business Chief Underwriter
CitiMortgage Inc.
Ms. Patricia Lindsay, former Vice President, Corporate Risk
New Century Financial Corporation
Ms. Susan Mills, Managing Director of Mortgage Finance
Citi Markets & Banking, Global Securitized Markets

Session 3: Citigroup Subprime-Related Structured Products and Risk Management
Mr. Murray C. Barnes, former Managing Director, Independent Risk
Citigroup, Inc.
Mr. David C. Bushnell, former Chief Risk Officer
Citigroup, Inc.
Mr. Nestor Dominguez, former Co-Head, Global Collateralized Debt Obligations
Citi Markets & Banking, Global Structured Credit Products
Mr. Thomas G. Maheras, former Co-Chief Executive Officer
Citi Markets & Banking

DAY TWO – THURSDAY, APRIL 8

Session 1: Citigroup Senior Management
Mr. Chuck Prince, former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
Citigroup, Inc.
Mr. Robert Rubin, former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors
Citigroup, Inc.

Session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Mr. John C. Dugan, Comptroller
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Mr. John D. Hawke Jr., former Comptroller
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

DAY THREE – FRIDAY, APRIL 9

Session 1: Fannie Mae
Mr. Robert J. Levin, former Executive Vice President and Chief Business Officer
Fannie Mae
Mr. Daniel H. Mudd, former President and Chief Executive Officer
Fannie Mae

Session 2: Office of the Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Mr. Armando Falcon Jr., former Director
Office of the Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Mr. James Lockhart, former Director
Office of the Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight

Now, it's up to the FCIC members to ask the tough questions.

This is a good sign. According to a report on a law firm website the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission has started issuing subpoenas. No word yet on whether they will subpoena former Bush regulators like SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC or Commission), which was created by Congress in 2009 to investigate the causes of the domestic and global economic crisis, has begun issuing far-reaching document subpoenas to financial institutions. Requests for testimony from individual current and former officers of those institutions likely will follow.

Let's hope that the FCIC is finally going to play hardball with those whose actions contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The incredibly important work of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission continues from April 7 - 9th in Washington DC. The FCIC is charged with determining the root causes of the global financial meltdown. A similar commission set up during the Great Depression revealed major abuses in the financial system and helped usher in reform.

The April FCIC meeting is titled Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). There will be hearings on the following entities: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and its predecessors the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).

Stay tuned for more information about the next FCIC meeting as it becomes available.

In an Ideas piece in Slate, former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer tackles concludes that while we already know many of the causes of the financial collapse, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission should answer four unanswered questions. The first:

The first structural issue that Phil Angelides and his colleagues should investigate is what corporate boards knew about the state of corporations they governed and why they did so little to protect them. The commission should inquire about what information board members received about risk and leverage and how accurate that information was. We need to understand exactly what the boards of Citi, Lehman, Merrill, Goldman, and Bank of America were told. Tracing the information flow will also permit us to understand whether the risk analysis was wrong from its inception, ignored by those up the chain, or filtered as it went up the chain.

In other words: what did the fat cats know and when did the fat cats know it? Corporate boards have a responsibility to their shareholders across America and the world. When corporate boards shirk their responsibilities, it's not just their shareholders who hurt. Bad corporate governance impacts the entire economy and causes pain for millions of people. It's time for answers and sunlight from these corporate boards. Spitzer's second question:

Second, the Angelides commission should dig into the corporate-compensation process. What, exactly, did compensation consultants and compensation committees say and do—and why? My one investigative experience in this area revealed a veritable swamp of conflicts and aberrant information flow. (Anybody with time to spare and a desire to read a horrifying tale of corporate failure should read Dan Webb's report about Dick Grasso's pay package.) The commission should dissect the actual e-mail traffic, determine what metrics were used by the comp consultants, and examine what information went to the comp committees of each of the companies that received any federal assistance. I would give long odds that they discover a welter of conflicts of interests—e.g., compensation consultants whose livelihoods depend on the good wishes of the CEO whose compensation package they are determining.

The American taxpayer forked over hundreds of billions of dollars to these fatcats. And, they continued to take lavish bonuses. We deserve to know the nature of how these bonuses and other compensation structures. After all, our money flowed into these structures, and, if they are corrupt, we deserve to know about it. Spitzer's third question:

Third, the rating agencies must bare their souls to the world. We know that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the way ratings agencies are compensated, but we do not yet know whether their straight analytical skills were right, wrong, or somewhere in between. Examining their actual financial models might reveal that they were as sophisticated as possible—or that they were unforgivably sloppy.

The rating agencies are the equivalent of the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. They are designed to provide independent analysis of risk. While Spitzer isn't alleging corruption, he wonders if their models are solid, or, just plain sloppy. If we're putting credence in these ratings, we need to know that they are based on sound modeling. Spitzer's final question:

Fourth, the commission must put the New York branch of the Fed under its microscope. The New York Fed was at the center of every major transaction during the meltdown, and it was the essential supervisor of the organizations and the credit markets beforehand. How did the New York Fed evaluate the risk, leverage, and stability of all the debt that accrued over the prior years. And what did New York Fed officials tell bank officials prior to and during the meltdown? The Fed has managed to avoid scrutiny for years. That should be permitted no longer. This record is too essential. Former New York Fed boss Geithner and Fed Chairman Bernanke misunderstood the impact that the sub-prime defaults would have on the broader credit markets: Was that a consequence of bad analytical work within the Fed? This question has enormous implications for how we respond, and it affects which institution should be vested with the so-called "systemic risk" regulator power.

We put a lot of faith in our regulatory bodies. Did they fail us? And, how, exactly, did they fail us in the lead up to the collapse? These are just a few unanswered questions and we deserve answers from Phil Angelides and his Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.